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THE LAW OF CONFLICTS AND COMPARATIVE
LAW: SOME SIMILARITIES AND LIMITATIONS*
Alexander Nekam**
A legal system can become involved with the values and under-
standings of another legal system in two different ways: by develop-
ing sensitivities towards the application of these values and by be-
coming interested in their content. The former results in the law of
conflicts, in attempts to integrate and balance foreign values within
the decision-making process of the forum. The latter results in com-
parative law, in attempts to penetrate and describe foreign values
through the point of view and the categories of the forum. Both the
law of conflicts and comparative law are excursions outside the
forum's own value system; they are attempts at exploring and manip-
ulating legal material by people who are strangers to it.
Preoccupation with foreign values, whether for conflicts purposes
or on a comparative basis, is not an innate characteristic of a legal
system. Most systems in the past have shown no sign of such an
interest and even today more isolated systems ignore it. These preoc-
cupations run counter to the emotional protection which surrounds
the forum's own values, and exceptional circumstances are needed for
them to emerge.
The values of our own system seem self-evident to us, part of
surrounding nature, the pattern of the world. Their obviousness is our
security, through them do we reach out into the absolute. They give
our world purpose, stability, and form. Their strength makes us ig-
nore what appears alien, and allows us to perceive only what is famil-
iar. For us they transform our community into the universe.
The strength of these feelings must recede and their exclusive-
ness diminish, before alien values can be noticed or an interest in
them can appear. Co-existence alone does not bring about such a
change. An affinity must develop, a sense of kinship which breaks
through indifference, a feeling that the other system, within its own
place and under certain conditions, is, after all, equal to our own.
Then only will alien values appear relevant and their recognition
impose itself. Foreign facts and events will-then be felt-meaningless
outside their setting, their treatment distorted, incomplete, without
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those values which form and surround their existence. The forum will
have to take note of these values. Only thus will its sense of justice
be satisfied, only then will it consider itself-to borrow the words of
Holmes-"civilized." ' A conflicts sensitivity will thus be born, and
in response to it, the law of conflicts will appear.
The same general climate is needed for the appearance and de-
velopment of comparative law. Here, too, the prerequisite is emo-
tional tolerance, the avoidance of a self-centered approach. The feel-
ing must develop that alien values, though different from one's own,
may be just as good within their own setting, that all values are
human, all value approaches unique. There can be no comparison
except among equals. Attitudes reflecting superiority are culture-
bound interpolations of one's own values; they become exercises in
collecting oddities. The growing awareness that facts have meaning
only within their social setting makes a conflicts approach first possi-
ble, then necessary: the same awareness is the guiding force behind
all efforts of a comparative kind. The two, therefore, always emerge
together and they tend to grow parallel to each other. Comparison,
in this sense, is closely related to the conflicts approach. It is a contin-
uation and a complement to it.
From another point of view as well, the law of conflicts and
comparative law are closely related. Unlike other legal disciplines
they both are essentially transitory; they are the consequences of that
particular phase of legal development in which value systems are
already interconnected but have not yet become unified. Separation
breeds differences in values, while contact between systems tends to
integrate them. Instant communications, ubiquitous, all embracing,
may well one day make all effective separation impossible and result
in one community with values shared by all. Such a millenium, if
ever it comes, will make both conflicts and comparative law obsolete
and incomprehensible.
In other respects, of course, the law of conflicts and comparative
law appear fundamentally different. The first is positive law, the
latter reflections on positive law. Comparative law is a descriptive,
non-value approach to values, an attempt to understand all values
the way they exist within their setting. The law of conflicts, on the
other hand, is value-colored. It assumes commensurability on the
forum's own terms, it changes all those foreign values it touches.
The central problems of comparative law have to do with the
transferability of values. How far can one penetrate a value system
which is not one's own? To what extent can one reinterpret foreign
values through the concepts and symbols of another system? What
1. Disconto Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel, 267 U.S. 22, 28 (1925).
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are the dangers and limitations of such a proceeding? The law of
conflicts on the other hand, does not have to face these problems. It
not only assumes commensurability, it creates it. It deals not with
foreign values as such, but with its own idea of what these values
must be. While it pays lip service to the finding and manipulating of
foreign values, it actually remakes them in order to integrate them
into its own system.
Conflicts is the forum's sense of justice at work in a setting con-
taining foreign elements; an attempt to reach solutions where, under
the sensitivity of the forum, no solutions could be obtained without
foreign values being considered. But such foreign values are only
noticed in order to satisfy the forum's sense of justice, and only in the
way and to the extent they happen to be needed to achieve this end.
The emotional correctness of the conflicts solution is independent of
a correct understanding of the foreign values involved. While compar-
ative law seems to remain a multipolar approach, the law of conflicts
always is self-ended: it is the result of an egocentric outlook; it re-
mains a single value system even though foreign values appear to be
incorporated into it.
And yet, even in this respect, comparative law and the law of
conflicts are much closer to each other than is generally admitted.
One may well ask whether values in any case can meaningfully be
approached by an outsider and whether therefore comparative law
itself is not, just as the law of conflicts, an exercise within only one
single value system, one's own.
Comparison, or rather the kind of bookish dictionary-inspired
exercise which so often goes under that name, seems easy, but is
misleading. It only results in our transplanting our own values,
through the assumed equivalence of our symbols, into a foreign sys-
tem where they, as such, have never existed. The possibility, on the
other hand, of comparison of a more sophisticated kind, of breaking
through the verbal symbolism of a foreign system and of perceiving
foreign values as they actually exist within their setting, may very
well elude us altogether. We may, of course, slowly become assimi-
lated into an alien community and, thus, eventually, come to share
its values, but such a community will then be no longer alien to us
and its values will have become our own. A more direct transfer
between value systems may well be impossible: we cannot in any
other way come to share the insider's feeling as to his values; we can
only obtain the outsider's notion that these values are somehow dif-
ferent from our own.
These difficulties can hardly be eliminated, though they can
easily be overlooked. They become obscured whenever we compare
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related systems, as we are so often likely to do - the common law
and the civil law for example, or the French law and the German -
in short, systems close enough to share fundamental values and, to
that extent, each other's approaches. And when we study systems far
less closely related, "primitive societies," "uncivilized countries,"
these difficulties will again be obscured, this time through our postu-
lating, from within our own system, a general pattern which exists
everywhere.
Yet, in spite of these limitations, what still can be achieved
through comparison is both important and highly practical. There are
things about a legal system which can never be seen if we consider
the system in isolation: the relativity of its values, the uniqueness of
its personality. Some awareness of what the others are doing, some
comparison of at least a formal kind is always needed in order to see
our own pattern in a more realistic perspective, and in order to find,
as Dean Pound has suggested, an effective antidote to the belief that
the familiar must necessarily be the only one.2 Such awareness may
also help to understand better the inner workings of decision-making:
the secondary role of rationalizations, and the great freedom for ma-
neuvering that a judge actually has. It may help us to realize how
much is conventional in our interpretations and to dislodge theories
burdened with the deposits of age.
In these respects, therefore, comparative law and the law of con-
flicts both meet and oppose each other. They are similar in that they
each deal with foreign law, without actually having to understand it
the way it would be understood within its own setting. They are
dissimilar in that comparative law reflects back upon the observer's
own system, adding something to his understanding of it, while the
law of conflicts expands that system by pretending to bring the out-
side world within its compass. Comparative law, thus, is essentially
an introspective endeavor, while the conflicts approach is expansive
and acquisitive.
2. Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School
Curriculum, 8 TuL. L. RE v. 161, 163 (1934).
1080 [Vol. 34
